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INTRODUCTION
In the last fifteen years, developing nations have signed over
fifteen hundred bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") in an effort to
attract foreign direct investment ("FDI") by creating a more stable
and transparent investment environment for foreign investors. 1
BITs provide foreign investors with powerful new rights to protect
their investments against expropriation and other forms of
discrimination and the ability to sue governments directly through an
innovative form of dispute settlement known as investment treaty

1. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment
Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development. National and International
(2003)
Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2003
U.N.
at
89,
Perspectives,
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2003ch3-en.pdf [hereinafter World Investment
Report 2003] (noting the consistent growth in the use of BITs since the first

signing in 1959).
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arbitration.2 In the last five years, there has been an explosion in the
number of investment treaty arbitration claims filed against
developing nations, challenging a wide array of sensitive government
regulations and routinely seeking millions and even billions of
dollars in damages.' Mounting an effective defense to these claims is
essential for a developing nation, as even a single successful investor
claim could wreak havoc on its economy, weaken its capacity to
regulate in the public interest, and damage its reputation as a
desirable investment location.4
While the number of investor claims is growing, there are new
concerns over how well-prepared developing nations are to cope
with the challenge of litigating these claims.
Investment treaty arbitration is a complex form of litigation that
demands much in the way of resources and legal expertise. Due to
financial and administrative barriers, many developing nations do not
have the legal expertise within their government service to defend
investment treaty claims. As a consequence, most developing nations
are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms who
2. Investment treaty arbitration is the process by which neutral arbitrators
settle disputes concerning bilateral treaty agreements between sovereign states and
foreign investors. States bring claims against private investors arising out of
interpretation or application disputes, and investors bring claims against the states
arising out of treaty violations. See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement
of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a
Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 52-55 (2005).
3. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard. Treaty Disputes, AM.
LAW.
Focus
EUR.,
Summer
2005,
available
at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/treaty0605.html.
This
survey
documents fifty-nine investment treaty arbitrations with stakes of at least $100
million, with eighteen over $1 billion. A sampling of these claims include: 1)
France Telecom's $2.9 billion claim against Lebanon over its contract to construct
and run a Lebanese mobile phone network; 2) A Canadian mining company's $1
billion claim against Venezuela for the expropriation of its gold mine; 3) Multiple
claims relating to Argentina's currency crisis collectively worth tens of billions of
dollars; 4) U.S. cellular communications company Motorola's $2 billion claim
against the Republic of Turkey over its investment in a Turkish mobile phone
system; and 5) A German consortium's $500 million claim against the Philippines
over the termination of a concession to build a new airport terminal.
4. See Victor R. Salgado, Comment, The Case Against Adopting BIT Law in
the FTAA Framework, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1025, 1053-59 (discussing the economic
hardships that Argentina now faces as a result of numerous arbitration claims filed
by investors who claim that Argentina's decision to end the one-to-one ratio
between the peso and the U.S. dollar violated the terms of their BIT commitments).
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charge the same premium market rates that wealthy individual
investors and corporations pay for their services. Meanwhile,
developing nations who cannot hire outside counsel are left to
contend with scattered and incomplete legal authority resources with
no organized legal assistance from the international community.
Unfortunately, these concerns are far from theoretical: in interviews
done for this article, developing nation lawyers report not having
access to fundamental sources of law and arbitration doctrine, or
having to go to extraordinary lengths to obtain it.
This article argues that developing nations' unequal access to legal
authority and expertise threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the
investment treaty arbitration process. Part I reviews the history,
significance, and content of the bilateral investment treaty-the type
of international agreement largely responsible for providing foreign
investors with powerful new rights. Part II looks at the rise of
investment treaty arbitration and its impact on developing nations.
Part III examines the serious barriers to the effective participation of
developing nations in investment treaty arbitration. Part IV
investigates how these barriers operate in practice, through two case
studies based on interviews with current and former developing
nation officials who have litigated investor-state arbitration cases.
Finally, Part V argues for the creation of a Legal Assistance Center,
modeled on a similar effort at the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), to ensure that developing nations have access to the legal
authority and expertise necessary to mount a competent defense to
investor treaty arbitration claims.

I. THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
MOVEMENT
Over the last three decades, international investment law has
undergone a remarkable amount of change. From the perspective of
the foreign investor, international investment law now offers far
more legal protection against expropriation and other forms of
discrimination at the hands of a host state than in the 1970s.5 The
5. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?:
An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46

HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 70 (2005) (asserting that formal international law and treaties
offer greater protection to investors than customary international law).
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primary tool effecting this change is the BIT, an agreement between
two countries that creates rules to govern investments made by the
nationals of one country into the territory of the other. This part
examines the origins of the BIT, its development, and the set of
rights it provides foreign investors.
A. ORIGINS OF THE BIT MOVEMENT

The origins of the BIT lie in the post-World War II efforts by
capital-exporting states, chiefly the United States and European
nations, to create a more rigorous international law of investment to
protect the rapidly expanding investments of their companies and
nationals abroad.6 Even as foreign direct investment began to take off
in the period following World War II, foreign investors who sought
the protection of international law found only scattered treaty
provisions and contested principles' of customary international law.'
Without the protection of international law, investors had no
assurances that a host state would not unilaterally change the terms
of an investment contract or laws and regulations affecting the
investment. 9 At the same time, international law did not offer foreign
investors an effective enforcement mechanism to challenge host
states that injured or expropriated their investments.' 0 Recourse to
the host state's courts was not considered adequate, as they may not
be sufficiently impartial to adjudicate a claim against their own
government." The only other option for aggrieved foreign investors

6. See id. at 71-72.
7. As late as the 1970's, for example, many Latin American nations held the
view-known as the "Calvo doctrine"-that states were only required to provide
aliens with the same treatment that they gave to nationals. This was in direct
conflict with the view of most developed nations, generally accepted today, that a
breach of international law can arise if a state does not respect the "minimum
standard of protection" under customary international law with regard to the
treatment of foreign investors. See UNCTAD, BilateralInvestment Treaties in the
Mid-1990s, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8
(1998) [hereinafter BITs in the Mid-1990s].
8. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68-70 (summarizing the
deficiencies in international investment law before the BIT gained prominence).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 69.
11. Additionally, domestic courts were unattractive to foreign investors
because many automatically applied their own national law even when
international law was clearly applicable. See UNCTAD & Int'l Ctr. for Settlement
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was to seek "diplomatic protection" by persuading their home
government to espouse their claim against the host state at the
International Court of Justice.12 However, this process is by its nature
more political than legal and is available only at the discretion of an
13
investor's home state.
Given the shortcomings of the customary international law, the
United States and other capital-exporting nations turned to signing
investment treaties to provide a source of clear and certain rules on
foreign investment. The treaty movement began with Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation ("FCNs"), agreements that
addressed numerous subjects beyond investment including trade,
maritime, and consular relations. 4 Despite containing some
protections for investment, FCNs soon fell out of favor, as they
contained only limited commitments and did not provide investors
with the ability to initiate a claim directly against a host state.' 5
With the failure of several early efforts to create a multilateral
international treaty on foreign investment, 6 the United States and
Europe turned to negotiating BITs with individual developing
nations. 7 Unlike FCNs, BITs were focused solely on protecting FDI
of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Course on Dispute Settlement in International Trade,
Investment and Intellectual Property: Module 2.2 Selecting the Appropriate
Forum, at 10, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 (Nov. 11, 2003)
(prepared
by
August
Reinisch)
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232addl-en.pdf [hereinafter Selecting the
Appropriate Forum].
12. See id. at 7.
13. See id. at 29.
14. See David R. Adair, Investors' Rights: The Evolutionary Process of
Investment Treaties, 6 TUL. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195, 196-97 (1999) (discussing

the progression of FCNs from agreements that only provided general protections to
investors' property to more sophisticated, particularized agreements that afforded
expanded protection to all parties).
15. See id.
16. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 71-72 (discussing the failure of
various multilateral efforts to create an international investment law treaty); see
also International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD], Investment and
Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use and Potential of International
Investment Agreements, at 21-25, (2004) (prepared by Aaron Cosbey, Howard
Mann, Luke Eric Peterson, & Konrad von Moltke) available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment-investand-sd.pdf
[hereinafter
Investment and SustainableDevelopment] (surveying failed attempts at negotiating
multilateral agreements on investment).
17. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 72-75 (chronicling the
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and contained an effective dispute resolution mechanism. Since the
signing of the first BIT in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan,
nearly 2400 BITs have been signed by over 175 nations, making it
the most popular form of international agreement for protecting
foreign direct investment. 8 Initially, the vast majority of BITs were
concluded between a developed and developing nation.' 9 However,
developing nations are increasingly signing BITs with one another, 0
reflecting the emergence of some firms from developing nations as
major regional and global investors.2 ' In addition to BITs, there are a
handful of regional investment agreements that are part of wider
trade and investment agreements like NAFTA and MERCOSUR. For
all practical purposes, the increasingly dense network of BITs and
regional agreements has displaced customary international law as the
primary source of international law in the area of foreign
investment.22
As major capital-exporters, developed nations sign investment
treaties primarily to protect the investments abroad of their nationals
and companies. Developing nations, meanwhile, sign investment
treaties in an effort to promote FDI. 23 The basic assumption behind
progression of the BIT movement in the United States and Europe).
18. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 89.
19. See id.
20. The largest percentage of total BITs signed during 2004 were between
developing nations (39%), followed closely by BITs between developed and
developing nations (37%). By the end of 2004, BITs between developing nations
accounted for 25% of total BITs concluded. See UNCTAD, Research Note: Recent
Developments in International Investment Agreements, at 3, U.N. Doc.
2005)
30,
(Aug.
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1
[hereinafter
http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditedir/docs/webiteiit2005 1_en.pdf
Recent Developments].
21. See id. at 4 (recognizing that the increase also stems from increased
investment cooperation between developing nations).
22. See BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 4.
23. The extent to which BITs actually attract increased flows of foreign direct
investment is not clear. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 89; see
also Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign
Direct Investment?, 22-23 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
http://www2003),
3121,
23
/O00
wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/
094946_03091104060047/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (finding little evidence
that BITs stimulate additional FDI to developing nations). But see Salacuse &
Sullivan, supra note 5, at 111 (finding that BITs have a particularly strong effect
on encouraging FDI to developing nations).
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an investment treaty is that the existence of a treaty with clear,
enforceable rules will attract more FDI by offering a more stable
investment environment.24 With the decline in lending from
commercial banks and official aid programs during 1980s and 1990s,
FDI has become the most important source of external capital for
developing nations,25 offering a host of potential benefits, including
job creation, technology transfers, and integration into global
networks of production.26
However, by signing a BIT a developing nation assumes
obligations that may be detrimental in the long-run. As capital
importers, developing countries bear most of the risk of investor
litigation inherent in signing a BIT. Moreover, BIT obligations can
lead to a loss of "national policy space" for host states by creating
legal obstacles that restrict its ability to change key economic and
regulatory policies in the future.27 Hence, when deciding whether or
not to sign a BIT developing nations must carefully weigh the
potential benefits of increased foreign direct investment against the
28
increased exposure to litigation from investors.
B. How Do BITs PROTECT INVESTMENT?

Bilateral investment treaties contain two key innovations that
make them a popular investment promotion device. First, they
provide investors with a clear set of investment protection standards
that have the status of international law. Second, they offer investors
24. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 77.
25. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 85 (asserting that
foreign direct investment provides a viable solution for countries seeking to
provide more long-term benefits and stability to their economies in the wake of
fewer aid options and increased financial crises); see also Salacuse & Sullivan,
supra note 13, at 77.
26. However, the potential benefits from foreign direct investment are far from
automatic. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 87-88. In order to
maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment, developing nations must create
the right domestic policy environment, including maintaining a skilled workforce
and sound infrastructure that allows them to become suppliers to the foreign
enterprise. Id.
27. See id. at 93 (recognizing that this danger is only increasing as the scope of
BITs moves beyond their traditionally "narrow coverage"); see also BITs in the
Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 7.
28. See id. (presenting some of the common advantages and disadvantages for
developing countries entering into a BIT).
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direct access to a binding, neutral form of investment dispute
resolution to enforce their treaty rights. Together, these innovations
operate to restrain host state governments in how they treat foreign
investors and investments.
There is substantial uniformity in the core content of most BITs. z9
Virtually all BITs address four substantive areas: "the scope and
definition of foreign investment; admission and establishment;
national treatment in the post-establishment phase; . . . guarantees
and compensation in the event of expropriation; . . . and dispute

settlement."3 BIT standards of treatment can be broken down into
specific standards that address discrete issues and general standards
that apply to all aspects of a foreign investment. Specific standards
frequently address issues like the right to transfer capital out of the
host state, performance requirements, and the employment of nonhost state personnel.3' For conceptual clarity, the general treatment
standards can be further classified as creating either absolute or
relative standards for host state conduct.3 2 Absolute standards
compare the host state's conduct against an external minimum
standard usually drawn from customary international law. These
include protection from unlawful expropriation and the requirements
that states provide investors with "fair and equitable treatment," "full
protection and security," and "treatment in accordance with
customary international law."33 Relative standards, on the other hand,
measure host state conduct by reference to how the host state treats
other groups of similarly situated investors. These include national
treatment,34 which requires host governments to treat foreign
investors no worse than their own nationals, and most favored nation
("MFN"),35 which requires states to provide the highest level of
treatment offered to the investors of any third-state.
29. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 89 box 111. 1.

30. Id.
31. See, e.g., U.S. Trade Rep., 2004 Model BIT, arts. 7-9 (Feb. 5, 2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset-upload_fil

e847_6897.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 2004 Model BIT].
32. See BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 53-65 (providing a
comprehensive overview of both the absolute and relative standards ordinarily
found in BITs).
33. See, e.g., U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 31, art. 5.
34. See id. art. 3.
35. See id. art. 4.
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Of course, the substantive rights and standards contained in
investment treaties mean nothing if investors cannot effectively
enforce them. One of the principal goals of the investment treaty
movement was to provide investors with the means to effectively
36
enforce their treaty rights.

II. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
DEVELOPING NATIONS
With the proliferation of BITs, an increasing percentage of global
FDI is protected by one or more investment treaty and foreign
investors have more opportunities to sue governments. This part
considers investment treaty arbitration as an innovative form of
dispute settlement, the recent sharp rise in investor claims, the actual
treaty arbitration process, and the impact of investment treaty
arbitration on developing nations.

A. THE RISE OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
Prior to the advent of investment treaty arbitration, investors had
very limited options for redressing violations of international law
that negatively impacted their investments.37 Since investors had no
standing under customary international law to bring a claim directly
against a state, their only recourse was to pursue the matter within
the host nation's courts or attempt to persuade their own government
to espouse their claim directly with the host government.38
In order to address these limitations, investment treaties contain
investor-state arbitration clauses which allow investors to sue states
directly to enforce their treaty rights.39 In essence, the arbitration
clause serves as a standing unilateral offer by a state to arbitrate any
36. See generally Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 70 (stating that foreign
investors now rely on an established set of international legal rules that provide
enforcement through international tribunals).
37. See id. at 69-70 (suggesting that international law provided no mechanism
for foreign investors to pursue claims when host countries failed to follow their
investment contract agreements). This gave investors little assurance that the host
country would not unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. Id.
38. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
39. An investor-state arbitration clause became virtually a standard BIT
provision during the 1980s and 1990s, the period when the vast majority of BITs
were negotiated. See BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 94.
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claims arising out of investments made by the nationals of the other
state party to the treaty.40 Investors "accept" this offer by initiating
arbitration under the relevant arbitration rules.4 ' This means that

foreign investors can directly enforce treaty rights without first
having to convince a government bureaucracy to espouse their claim
and avoid the risk of their dispute getting consumed by the dictates
of larger foreign policy considerations. 4 2 The significance of this
innovation in dispute settlement should not be overlooked. At the
WTO, by way of comparison, only states have a cause of action
against other states for violations of trade law. 43 This mechanism
provides investment treaties with a practical significance by allowing
investors to enforce their treaty rights by initiating compulsory
arbitration with a binding, enforceable award.
Investors are increasingly initiating arbitration to redress alleged
violations of investment treaty rights by host governments. The
number of investment treaty arbitration disputes filed at the World
Bank Group's International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") and other arbitration fora has exploded in recent
years. As of November 2005, the cumulative number of known
claims reached 219, compared with just 75 in 2000. 44 The vast
majority of these arbitrations have been either administered by
ICSID or held on an ad-hoc basis under the United Nations
Commission for International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") rules.45

40. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN

INV. L.J. 232, 232 (1995).
41. Seeid.at234.
42. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: PrivatizingPublic InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions,

73

FORDHAM

L.

REV.

1521, 1537-38 (2005).

43. See generally Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private
Partiesto Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2275, 2277 (1997) (asserting that the WTO's "nations only" policy
cripples the effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism).
44. See UJNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement
11A Monitor No. 4, at 1 fig. 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IT/2005/2 (2005),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiit20052-en.pdf
[hereinafter
Latest
Developments].
45. Of the two hundred and nineteen known investment treaty claims, one
hundred and thirty-two have been administered by ICSID, sixty-five under the
UNCITRAL Rules, and only twenty-two under other arbitration rules. See id. at 12 fig. 2.
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The rise in investment treaty claims can be attributed to several
factors. With the long-term rise in FDI and the increasingly dense
network of BITs, there are simply more opportunities for disputes to
arise that are covered by an investment treaty. Moreover, the
will likely
increased frequency of larger arbitration awards
encourage more investors to utilize investment treaty arbitration
clauses.46 Arbitration practitioners predict the volume of claims to
continue to grow as investors and lawyers become more aware of the
rights contained in BITs and other investment treaties. 4 7 Indeed,
many lawyers already advise investors on how to structure their
investments to take advantage of one or even multiple investment
treaties.48
B. OVERVIEW OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
At the outset of a dispute, most investment treaties present
investors with a choice between litigating in the host state's courts or
some form of investment treaty arbitration. Since investors remain
dubious of the impartiality of host state's courts, they invariably
choose to arbitrate the dispute.49 Most investment treaties provide
investors with a choice between arbitration conducted by ICSID or
ad-hoc arbitration administered under the UNCITRAL arbitration
rules." There are important differences between these two forms of
arbitration with regard to the transparency and supervision of the
proceedings. As an institution specifically designed to handle
investor-state disputes, ICSID offers facilities to conduct the
arbitration proceedings and support during the proceedings from its
staff.5 Ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, on the other
hand, takes place on a de-localized and unsupervised basis.5
Investors sometimes prefer ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL

46. See id. at 3.
47. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1538-39 ("exponential explosion of claims
under a variety of investment treaties").
48. See id. at 1535.
49. See id. at 1542.
50. George M. von Mehren et al., Navigating through Investor-State
Arbitrations-An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, 59 APR DISP.
RESOL. J. 69, 70 (2004).
51. See Selecting the AppropriateForum, supra note 11, at 15-18.
52. See id. at 26.
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rules because it offers more flexibility to structure the proceedings,
enhanced privacy, and the possibility of interim damages.53
The arbitration process begins when a foreign investor files a
claim with one of the arbitration facilities designated in the
investment treaty.54 Both parties then participate in the selection of
the arbitration tribunal, with each party selecting one arbitrator and
jointly appointing a third to serve as chairman. 5 From there, the
exact order of the process will depend on the relevant arbitration
rules and the parties' preferences.56 Ordinarily, the parties submit
memorials outlining their case, then exchange evidence, submit
additional written submissions, debate issues of law and fact during
oral hearings, and the tribunal ultimately determines if an award is
justified.57 ICSID tribunals value well-organized and well-researched
written submissions, and generally a party can gain the most
influence through the written portion of the case. 8 The oral hearings
are shorter by comparison, and primarily offer an opportunity to
present witnesses and respond to the arbitrators' principal questions
and concerns.59 Opportunities to challenge tribunal awards are very
limited: the investment treaty arbitration system has no appellate
review and there are very limited grounds for annulment.6 °

53. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1548-49.
54. See id. at 1543.
55. See id.
56. At the outset of the dispute, the parties and the tribunal chairman generally
hold a procedural meeting where the parties have broad flexibility to determine the
format of the proceedings, including the timing and number of pleadings and
whether to dispense with oral hearings. See, e.g., ICSID, ICSID Convention,
Regulations and Rules, R. 20, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (April 2006) available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
57. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1544-45.
58. See Lucy REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION, 83-84, (2004).
59. See id. at 84.

60. A party's options for challenging an award vary depending on whether it
was rendered under ICSID Convention or under another set of arbitration rules.
See Franck, supra note 42, at 1545-57. However, none of the available methods
generally permit review of the merits or correction of legal errors. Instead,
opportunities for annulment are generally limited to a handful of procedural
deficiencies. Id.
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C. THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION ON
DEVELOPING NATIONS

As net importers of global capital, developing nations have borne
the brunt of the burden of defending the growing number of
investment treaty claims. According to U. N. Conference on Trade
and Development ("UNCTAD") data, nearly two-thirds of the 219
known investment treaty claims have been filed against developing
nation governments. 61 Thirty-seven different developing nations are
known to have been defendants in investment treaty arbitration, with
several facing multiple claims.62 Argentina has faced an incredible
63
forty- two claims, with Mexico a distant second at seventeen.
Developing nations' experience with investment treaty arbitration is
almost exclusively as defendants: there are only eleven known
instances where developing nation firms have filed investment treaty
claims. 64 Due to the confidentiality surrounding non-ICSID
arbitrations, the actual number of claims against developing nations
is likely to be significantly higher.65
Defending investment treaty arbitration claims poses a number of
challenges for developing nations, including the cost of litigation, the
possibility of a large adverse award, and even new limitations on its
freedom to implement government policies deemed inconsistent with
treaty obligations.66 While information on the size of investor claims
is often sporadic, some of the known awards against developing
nations involve substantial sums. For example, the Czech Republic
was ordered to pay $270 million plus substantial interest to a Dutchbased broadcasting firm after the tribunal found the media regulatory
authorities had violated the terms of the Netherlands-Czech Republic
BIT.67 In 2002, Ecuador was ordered to pay $71 million to
61. See Latest Developments, supra note 44, at 9-10.
62. See id. at 3.
63. See id.
64. See UNCTAD, Comm'n on Inv., Tech. & Related Fin. Issues, InvestorState Disputes and Policy Implications, at 4, U.N. Doc. TB/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14,
2005) http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d62-en.pdf [hereinafter Investor-State
Disputes].
65. See Latest Developments, supra note 44, at 3.
66. See id. at 7-8.
67. See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Final Award,
Mar.
14, 2003), available at
649 (UNCITRAL Arb. Proceedings,
http://investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAward- 14Mar2003.pdf.
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Occidental, a U.S.-based energy company, after a tribunal found an
administrative change in its tax code violated the U.S.-Ecuador
BIT.68 More recently, an ICSID tribunal awarded a U.S. energy
company $133 million in 2005 after finding Argentina in breach of
the Argentina-U.S. BIT as a result of measures taken by the
Argentine Government in response to that country's financial crisis.69
The wave of investor lawsuits has far-reaching implications for
developing nations' freedom to regulate in the public interest.
Investors have turned to investment treaty arbitration to challenge a
wide variety of government measures in a number of sensitive areas,including the provision of water, electricity, waste disposal, and
sanitation services to the public. In at least nine cases, foreign
investors that provided water and sewage in developing countries
have filed investment treaty claims to resolve their differences with
state and local regulatory authorities.7 0 Other treaty-based investor
lawsuits have challenged the denial of a permit to operate a waste
disposal facility, 7' the decision of the tax authorities regarding a
value-added tax formula,72 the revocation of a permit to operate an
industrial factory near protected wetlands, 73 and the licensing of
cellular telecommunications.7 4
68. See Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Ecuador, Final Award,
London Ct. of Int'l Arb., Case No. UN 3467, at 73 (July 1, 2004), available at
http://investmentclaims.com/decisions/Occidental-Ecuador-FinalAward1Jul2004.pdf.
69. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 2 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1257.
70. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. [IISD], Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Development Policy-Making, at 16, (Nov. 2004) (prepared by Luke Eric
Peterson) available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade-bits.pdf [hereinafter
BITs and Development].
71. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
41, (May 29, 2003), available at
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2,
http://investmentclaims.com!decisions/Tecnicas-Mexico-Award-29May2003Eng.pdf (disputing the United Mexican States' decision not to renew T6nicas
Medioambientales' landfill operating permit).
72. See OccidentalExploration & Production Co., supra note 68, at 2.
73. See Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. & Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru,
18, (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4,
http://investmentclaims.com/decisions/Luchetti-Peru-Award-7Feb2005.pdf.
74. See Press Release, France Telecom, Award of the Arbitration Tribunal on
2005),
(Feb.
22,
Republic
of Lebanon
with
the
the
Dispute
http://www.francetelecom.com/en!financials/j oumalists/press-releases/CPold/att
0029460/CPLIBAN_050222.pdf.
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IIl.THE CASE FOR REFORM: ENSURING THE
FULL PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING
NATIONS IN INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION
Given that the vast majority of investment treaty claims are filed
against developing nations, it is critical that they be able to actively
participate in the dispute settlement process. In reality, developing
nations face a network of barriers that discourage their full
participation in the treaty arbitration process. This section examines
three barriers to the effective participation of developing nations in
the treaty arbitration process: a lack of affordable access to legal
expertise, a lack of transparency in the arbitration process, and
uncertainty over the meaning of key treaty rights.
A. ACCESS TO LEGAL EXPERTISE

In any form of litigation, a party's lawyers' level of expertise will
likely be a decisive factor in the outcome of the dispute. The
importance of having access to legal expertise is only magnified in a
specialized area of the law like investment treaty arbitration with
which most lawyers have little familiarity. Expertise in this field is
generally limited to a close-knit community of lawyers and
arbitrators who work for one of a handful of major international law
firms with specialty practices in this area." Hiring one of these firms
offers a number of significant advantages. First, lawyers in these
firms litigate investment treaty arbitration cases more frequently than
other parties, gaining valuable experience and professional contacts
in the process. Second, the firm offers significant "institutional
memory" with regard to past arbitration awards, the relevant6
7
arbitration rules, arbitrator selection, and general litigation tactics.
75. Some of the few major global law firms with specialty practices in this
field include: Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Paris), Allen & Overy (London),
White & Case (Washington DC), and Covington & Burling (Washington DC).
76. The Arbitration Practice web-site of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, a
leading international firm for investor-state arbitration states:
Our international arbitration practice consists of over 80 practitioners
worldwide with an unrivalled track record of conducting international
arbitrations under all major institutional rules to the highest professional
standards, no matter where or under what law or language-from French to
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Some partners and lawyers in the major international firms have
served as arbitrators in other cases, providing unique insight into the
process. 7' Knowledge gained from participating in past arbitrations,
including those that go unpublished or settle before an award, can
provide extra leverage in persuading governments-particularly
those with minimal experience in the arbitration process-to settle
investor claims. 7 Lastly, a firm will have the best possible access to
both published and unpublished sources of legal authority via inhouse law libraries, support staff, and informal professional
networks.
The foreign investors who initiate investment treaty arbitration
claims invariably hire one of the major international law firms with
specialty practices in investment treaty arbitration. 79 Developed
nations tend to have the resources and legal expertise in their
government ministries to ably defend themselves in investment treaty
arbitration.8" Due to a lack of expertise and resources within their
Mandarin-they are conducted ....

Our arbitration practice is also at the

vanguard in representing private investors and governments in arbitrations
under bilateral investment treaties.
Freshfields
Bruckhaus
Deringer,
Our
Arbitration
Practice,
http://www.freshfields.com/practice/arbitration/en.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
77. The International Arbitration practice web-site of Arnold & Porter states:
In addition to their service as counsel in international arbitrations, the
firm's attorneys have served other prominent roles in the arbitration
community, including as arbitrators before ICSID, the ICC, the AAA and
other institutions; as Chair or members of Bar Committees on international
arbitration; as organizers, moderators or speakers at international conferences;
and as members of Task Forces organized to consider reforms in the arbitral
rules or procedures of leading institutions.
Arnold
&
Porter,
International
Arbitration,
http://www.amoldporter.com/practice.cfm?practice-id=68 (last visited Jan. 26,
2006).
78. See BITs and Development, supra note 70, at 26.
79. In an informal review of the seventy-nine arbitration awards posted on the
Investment Treaty Arbitration web-site, the investor claimant was always
represented by outside counsel. See Inv. Treaty Arb. [ita], New Awards, Decisions
and Orders on ita, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2007); see also CMS
Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1206 (showing claimant was
represented by the world renowned arbitration law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP).
80. For example, the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International
Claims and Investment Disputes is the largest department within the U.S.
Department of State's Office of the Legal Adviser, which is comprised of
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own government service, many developing nations are forced to hire
outside counsel to defend investment treaty claims.
These firms may demand fees matching those charged to their
other clients, including private corporations, wealthy individual
investors, and more prosperous governments. Hourly rates for these

elite firms can range from $400-$600 or more an hour per lawyer."
Considering a claim is likely to be handled by a team of lawyers and
the arbitration process frequently takes two or more years to
complete, the legal bill can be staggering. One study found that

average legal costs for governments range between $1 to $2 million
per year.12 Meanwhile, the average cost for hiring a three judge panel
of arbitrators runs $400,000 or more. 83 The Czech Republic is
reported to have spent $10 million to defend against two treaty
claims related to the regulation of its media sector.8 4 More recently,
the Czech Republic announced it would spend $3.3 million in 2004
and $13.8 million in 2005 to defend against more than a half-dozen
investor claims.8 Clearly, the cost of treaty arbitration is beyond the
means of many developing nations, particularly the Least-Developed
Countries ("LDCs").8 6
approximately one hundred and thirty permanent attorneys and about seventy
support staff. See U.S. Dep't of State, Practicing Law in the Office of the Legal
Adviser, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3433.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). The
United States has faced nine different investment treaty arbitration claims brought
under NAFTA's investment chapter, but has not lost a claim to date. Id.
81. See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 64, at 14 (noting that the expected
legal fees incurred by the Czech Republic for one case were over $13.8 million one
year).
82. See id.
83. See id.; see also ICSID, Schedule of Fees, (July 6, 2005),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/schedule/fees.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2007)
(finding that in 2005, ICSID increased the daily fee payable to ICSID arbitrators
from $2,000 to $3,000). This figure is exclusive of additional costs for travel,
meals, lodging, and administrative expenses. Id.
84. See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 64, at 14; see also Luke Eric
Peterson, Latest Arbitration Against Argentine Emergency FinancialMeasures,
INV.
L.
&
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.
WKLY.
BULL.,
Mar.
7,
2003,
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment-investsdmarch_2003.pdf.
85. See Luke Eric Peterson, Croatian Firm Invokes Investment Treaty to
Challenge Czech Eviction Notice, INV. L. & SUSTAINABLE DEV. WKLY. BULL.,
Oct. 1, 2004, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investmentinvestsd-octl_2004.pdf.
86. See generally UNCTAD, Statistical Profiles of the Least Developed
Countries, at 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/Misc/2005/3 (2005) (preparedby the
UNCTAD
secretariat)
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldcmisc20053_en.pdf
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Not all developing nations hire outside counsel, whether for
financial or tactical reasons. This may mean that the task of
defending an investment treaty claim falls to government attorneys
without the experience or resources to mount a vigorous defense. In
some cases, this can lead to shocking disparities in the quality of
legal representation between investor claimants and developing
nation defendants. For example, the Seychelles' Attorney General,
who had no prior experience with investor-state arbitration, reports
defending a recent ICSID claim without access to a reliable internet
connection, Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, or basic treatises on ICSID or
investment arbitration. s7 Likewise, when Argentina first began
defending investment treaty claims, the Solicitor General's office did
not have access to fundamental substantive law or arbitration
doctrine.8" During its first investment treaty cases, Argentina's
attorneys had to fly to Washington, DC ahead of ICSID arbitration
hearings to conduct the necessary legal research and even spent their
own money to buy copies of key arbitration treatises.89
Over the course of time, some developing nations have been able
to build up considerable expertise in defending against investment
treaty arbitration claims. Argentina, for example, has defended many
of the claims filed against them without resort to outside counsel,
building up substantial expertise in defending treaty claims in the
process.9" Building up that expertise, however, takes time and may
require the diversion of resources from other pressing legal and
regulatory matters. 9 1 Smaller, poorer developing nations are far less
likely to have the financial or human resources to build the in-house
capacity to defend investment treaty claims. What's more troubling,
the efforts of developing nation lawyers to acquire the requisite
expertise "on the job" are frustrated by the lack of transparency
surrounding the treaty arbitration process.

(highlighting that the LDCs only comprise 0.6% of the world's GDP, while
arbitrations cost millions of dollars that these LDCs do not have, because by
definition, LDCs possess low gross national income).
87. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
88. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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B. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

Investment treaty arbitration is characterized by a lack of
transparency at every stage of the arbitration process. Without the
consent of the parties to the arbitration-the investor and the statethere is generally no public access to the pleadings, evidence,
hearings, or even the tribunal award.92 This section looks at how two
aspects of this opacity-problems with finding past arbitral awards
and the lack of third party participation-hinder developing nations'
full participation in the arbitration process.
1. Access to Arbitral Case Law
Developing country counsel seeking to find relevant precedent are
forced to engage in a kind of legal scavenger hunt through scattered
and incomplete sources for past arbitral awards. While there is no
formal rule of stare decisis in investment treaty arbitration, lawyers
and arbitrators often consider and cite prior arbitral awards as a form
of authority when confronted with similar issues of law or fact. 93
Access to this arbitral case law is particularly vital in a field like
public international investment law where there are relatively few
decided cases and every decision draws new lines.
The first barrier to finding relevant precedent is a lack of public
knowledge that an investment treaty dispute exists: of the major
arbitral fora, only ICSID maintains a public registry of claims.94 The
UNCITRAL Secretariat does not even maintain internal records of
the cases brought under the UNCITRAL rules.95 Even when the
existence of a claim is made public, the tribunal award may not be
92. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 48(5), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1271, 1288, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, 188 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] ("The Centre shall not publish
the award without the consent of the parties."); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 32(5), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] ("The award
may be made public only with the consent of both parties.").
93. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From
NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
679, 689 (2004).
Cases,
Pending
of
List
ICSID,
94. See
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
95. See Investment and SustainableDevelopment, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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published. Despite their importance as a source of law, none of the
investment treaty arbitration fora publish awards without the consent
of both parties.96 While many awards are eventually made public by
one or both of the parties, some nonetheless remain unpublished.
Meanwhile, at least some of the unpublished awards are
informally traded within a "magic circle" of law firms and arbitrators
that work in this field.97 The existence of these "hidden" awards
provides arbitration insiders-the firms and practitioners within this
informal professional network-with the unfair advantage of having
access to a wider array of authority to fight and win their cases.98 At
the same time, those without the resources to hire one of the major
multinational firms are deprived of relevant authority to defend
against investor claims. 99 As outsiders, developing nations are faced
with scattered and incomplete sources of authority, raising the
difficulty and risk of litigating without assistance from outside
counsel.
2. Third PartyParticipation

Given its origins in international commercial arbitration, it is not
surprising that investment treaty arbitration has not traditionally
welcomed the participation of outside parties. Tribunal hearings
under ICSID and the other arbitral institutions remain private unless
96. See ICSID Convention, supra note 92, art. 48(5), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575
U.N.T.S. at 188 (prohibiting the publication of an award without the consent of the
parties); see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 92, art. 32(5). It
should be noted that ICSID Arbitration Rule 48(4) allows ICSID to publish
excerpts from the legal holdings of awards when the consent of the parties cannot
be obtained and the award is unavailable from another source. See ICSID
Convention, supra note 92, art. 48(4), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188.
However, these excerpts are a poor substitute for access to the full text of an award
because it is often difficult to assess the significance of an isolated statement of the
law or passage when removed from its factual context.
97. See Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration,
2003,
Mar.
INTELLIGENCE,
L.
&
ENERGY
GAS
OIL,
(complaining
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_56.htm
that access to arbitration decisions is only for the prominent law firms and that all
types of lawyers should have equal access to these decisions).
98. See id.
99. See BITs and Development, supra note 70, at 26 (finding that the lack of
resources of developing countries to hire large law firms to handle arbitration,
creates an unfair competitive advantage for wealthier nations).
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both parties consent to the presence of a third party.10 0 Access to the
pleadings, evidence, and awards is therefore limited to the parties to
the dispute. None of the major arbitral institution rules explicitly
allow for the submission of amicus briefs from third parties. In one
instance, an UNCITRAL tribunal concluded it had the authority to
accept amicus briefs from several non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"). 101
While greater third party participation in investment treaty
arbitration has been justified by noting the public interest in the
issues in dispute, it also has the potential to indirectly promote
developing nations' participation in the dispute settlement process.
As the Seychelles' experience shows, we cannot assume that
developing nations have access to the relevant legal authority and
expertise necessary to mount a vigorous defense. Amicus briefs
from NGOs and other informed parties may be able, in certain cases,
to supplement a developing nation's defense, ensuring that the
tribunal has all of the relevant arguments and precedent before it to
make an informed decision.
Some have raised concerns that allowing amicus participation and
access to hearings could overwhelm the resources of the tribunal,
increasing the costs of the dispute and the breadth of issues that each
party must address in its arguments. While these are legitimate
concerns, tribunals have methods at their disposal to limit third party
100. See ICSID Rules, supra note 56, R. 32(2) (requiring consent of parties to
third party participation in oral hearings); see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
supra note 92, art. 25(4) ("Hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties

agree otherwise.").
101. In Methanex v. United States, a NAFTA-based claim under UNCITRAL
arbitration rules, a Canadian Corporation sued the United States to recover profits
lost as the result a California statute banning MTBE, a gasoline additive shown to
pollute the groundwater and linked to cancer in laboratory animals. See Methanex
Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and
Merits, 44 J.L.M. 1345, 1345-47 (Aug. 3, 2005). Three NGOs, two from the U.S.
and one based in Canada, petitioned the tribunal for amici status to argue that-the
California ban was not tantamount to expropriation or in violation of other NAFTA
investment protection standards. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici
Curiae,"
1-8,
(Jan.
15,
2001),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6039.pdf. In deciding to accept the

amicus briefs, the tribunal reasoned: "There is an undoubtedly public interest in
this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual
transnational arbitration between commercial parties." Id. 49.
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participation before it becomes too burdensome. NAFTA tribunals,
for example, consider a number of factors before accepting an
amicus brief, including the degree to which the submission would
offer a perspective or knowledge on a factual or legal issue relevant
to the arbitration that is different from the parties to the dispute,
whether it addresses issues within the scope of the dispute, and the
third party's and the public's interest in the dispute. 0 2 The prospect
of a tribunal facing an overwhelming number of relevant third-party
briefs is remote at best. WTO panels, where amici briefs are now
permitted, have not reported problems with an overwhelming
number of amici submissions. 03 Furthermore, because potential
amici often realize that their influence is maximized when they unite
04
to produce a single brief clearly stating their concerns.1
C. UNCERTAINTY OVER THE MEANING OF KEY TREATY
STANDARDS

Key provisions of investment treaties are often written in
deliberately vague language in an effort to capture FDI in all its
forms. This open-ended approach can be an asset in a field like
foreign investment where it is impossible to predict what new
investment vehicles and structures investors will utilize in
tomorrow's business world. However, too much indeterminacy can
be a burden for both foreign investors and states, who cannot
anticipate how to comply with the law. Only with the recent rise in
investment treaty claims have tribunals begun to further define the
meaning of key BIT standards. 0 5 Adding to the confusion, in several
instances investment treaty tribunals have come to different
102. See Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party

Participation, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Nondisputing-en.pdf

(last

visited Jan. 14, 2007).
103. See IISD, Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper, "Possible Improvements
of the Frameworkfor ICSID Arbitration," 9, (Dec. 2004) (preparedby Howard

Mann,

et

al.),

available

at

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment icsidresponse.pdf#search=%22iisd%20
%22Comments%20on%201CSID%20Discussion%20Paper%22%22.

104. See id.
105. See BITs and Development, supra note 70, at 27; see also ICSID, Possible
Improvements of the Frameworkfor ICSID Arbitration,
2-7 (Oct. 22, 2004)
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf.

(explaining that the number of cases before the ICSID has risen drastically since
2002).
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conclusions over the meaning and application of these standards
06
even when confronted with the same set of facts.
While the uncertainty surrounding BIT standards affects both
investors and states, developing nations are less well-equipped to
mitigate the risks of litigating in such a challenging environment.
Developing nations who cannot hire outside counsel may not have
access to the "hidden awards" and other forms of legal authority that
may be able to provide valuable guidance on how a treaty provision
has been applied in similar factual settings. 1 7 From a strategic point
of view, the uncertainty over treaty standards may make developing
nations more prone to settling even spurious investor claims rather
than bear the expense of litigation and the risk of a financially
devastating award.108

IV.TALES FROM THE FRONT: DEVELOPING
NATION EXPERIENCES
To date, at least thirty-seven developing nations have faced
investment treaty arbitration.10 9 During research for this article, I had
the privilege of interviewing current and former government officials
of Argentina and the Republic of the Seychelles with first-hand
experience in defending their respective countries in ICSID
arbitrations. Their stories reveal the difficulties developing nations
may experience locating relevant precedent and other basic forms of
legal authority. The Seychelles' experience, 110 in particular, is an
106. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1558-82 (describing the Lauder Arbitrations,
where a Stockholm tribunal and a London tribunal decided factually identical
disputes differently).
107. See supra notes 112-14, and accompanying text (describing how major
multinational law firms have access to otherwise unavailable unpublished awards
and share these amongst themselves).
108. See BITs and Development, supra note 70, at 28.
109. See supra note 62, and accompanying text.
110. The investor claim against the Seychelles was based on a contract ICSID
arbitration clause, not a bilateral investment treaty. It is nevertheless relevant
because the problems the Seychelles encountered in finding legal expertise and
authority would have existed regardless of the basis for the investor claim. In fact,
defending a treaty-based claim is likely to be even more demanding because it
requires an understanding of current trends in public international investment law.
See CDC Group PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/14,
3-6
(Dec.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CDCvSeychellesAward_001 .pdf
[hereinafter
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alarming illustration of how smaller developing nations who cannot
afford outside counsel may defend themselves without access to
basic legal authority, with potentially disastrous results. Taken
together, these disturbing reports show that the barriers discussed in
part III and not merely theoretical and call for some response from
the international community.

A. CDC v. SEYCHELLES
On August 22, 2002, the Commonwealth Development
Corporation ("CDC"), a U.K.-owned development finance company,
lodged a Request for Arbitration with ICSID against the Republic of
the Seychelles under a contract-based ICSID arbitration clause.1"'
The request alleged that the Republic failed to honor two loan
guarantees it had given as security for a loan to its Public Utility
Corporation ("PUC") to purchase electric generators. 12 Both loan
guarantees provided that any dispute arising from the contract would
be settled according to U.K. law.1I 3
CDC was represented by a team of lawyers from Allen & Overy, a
major international law firm based in London with a specialty
practice in investor-state arbitration.1 14 The Seychelles was
represented solely by its Attorney General, Mr. Anthony Fernando.1 15
The Republic had never been sued by a foreign investor before, and
Mr. Fernando had no prior experience litigating ICSID or other
investor-state claims. 1 6 His office had an unreliable internet
connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, and no treatises on
ICSID or investment arbitration.' 17 Though several major

CDC Group, Award].
111. The Republic of the Seychelles, located northeast of Madagascar, is an
Indian Ocean archipelago with a population of roughly 80,000. See CDC Group
PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/14,
2
(June
29,
2005),
available
at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CDC-Seychelles-AnnulmentDecision.pdf [hereinafter CDC Group, Annulment Proceeding].
112. See CDC Group, Award, supra note 110,
7-9.
113. See id. 4.
114. See id. cover page.
115. See id.
116. See Telephone Interview with Anthony Fernando, Attorney General of the
Republic of the Seychelles (Mar. 25, 2005).
117. See id.
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international law firms offered to represent the Republic, at $400600 per hour per lawyer their fees would have exhausted his office
budget in just weeks. 18 In the end, Mr. Fernando, a civil law lawyer
by training whose daily work typically involves criminal,
constitutional, and administrative law, defended the Republic with
only his wits, a copy of the ICSID Convention and Rules, and two
outdated English contract law treatises.' 19
On December 17, 2003, the tribunal, composed of a single
arbitrator, found the Seychelles had no valid defense to CDC's
default claim under U.K. contract law. 120 In the award, the tribunal
noted that the Seychelles' counter-memorial failed to comply with
the tribunal's initial directions"' and one of its principal defenses
relied on a long-since overruled case in English contract law.1 22 The
tribunal awarded CDC the full outstanding principal, interest, and
eighty percent of its legal costs for a total of £2,446,701, or roughly
$4.6 million.1 23 It also held that, under the terms of the 1990 and
1993 loan agreements, interest would continue to accrue at nine
24
percent per annum or a total of roughly $1,000 per day.1
On March 30, 2004, the Republic filed for annulment of the award
under ICSID Article 52(1), asserting that "the Tribunal manifestly
had exceeded its powers, that it had seriously departed from a
fundamental rule of procedure, and that the Award failed to state the
reasons on which it was based.

' 125

On June 29, 2005 an Annulment

Committee composed of three arbitrators rejected all three of the
Republic's grounds for annulment, concluding in harsh tones that the
claim was "fundamentally lacking in merit.'

26

Despite expressing

reservations about the effect that the ruling might have on the

118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See CDC Group, Award, supra note 110, 61.
121. See id. 26 (listing a failure to provide "written statements of witnesses
and expert reports on which the Republic intended to rely" as the ways the countermemorial failed to comply).
58-59 (citing National Westminster Bank Plc v. Morgan [1985]
122. See id.
A.C. 686, 708, which overturned Lloyds Bank v. Lundy [1975] 1 Q.B. 326, 339).
123. See id. 62.
124. See id.
125. CDC Group, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 111, 15.
126. Id. 89.
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Seychelles' economy, 2 7 the Committee awarded CDC the full costs
of its counsel (f83,345) and held that the Republic should bear all
the costs associated with ICSID and the Committee, as well as its
28
own expenses.
B.

THE VIEW FROM ARGENTINA

Perhaps more than any other nation, Argentina understands the
financial and administrative challenge of defending investment treaty
arbitration claims. In January of 2002, facing an imminent default on
its massive foreign debt, Argentina passed emergency economic
legislation that, among other things, ended parity between the U.S.
dollar and Argentine peso, converted dollar deposits and loans to
pesos, and removed the right of public utilities to raise rates or
charge in dollars. 29 These measures have resulted in massive losses
for foreign investors who hold the majority of Argentina's public
debt and own many of the privatized utility companies. 13 0 In just the
year 2003, there were twenty lawsuits filed by transnational
corporations against Argentina claiming violations of BITs.' 3' As of
December 2004, Argentina was a defendant in an unprecedented
thirty-seven pending investor-state arbitration claims-thirty-two of
32
which are filed at ICSID-worth over $16 billion dollars.
Ignacio Suarez worked for Argentina's Solicitor General's office
from 2000-2003.33 He became interested in the field while
completing his LLM from Harvard Law School and later working for
a French law firm on a number of investor-state arbitration cases.'3 4
When he started in 2000, Argentina was a defendant in only one
ICSID proceeding and he was the sole lawyer with any experience in
the investor-state arbitration field. 131 Having come from working for
127. See id.
128. Seeid. 91.
129. See South Centre, Will Investment Rules Shrink Policy Space for
Sustainable Development? Evidence From the Electricity Sector, 17-19, (Dec.
2003), available at http://www.yorku.ca/hdrnet/images/uploaded/Cho-2003.pdf.
130. See id. at 16-17.
13 1. See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 64, at 5.
132. See id.
133. See Telephone Interview with Carlos Ignacio Suarez Anzorena, Latin
America Specialist Advisor (Mar. 23, 2005).
134. See id.
135. See id.
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a major international law firm, the lack of access to legal resources
was a real surprise: the office did not have a subscription to Westlaw,
Lexis-Nexis, or any of the major arbitration reporters. 13 6 To.prepare
for his first ICSID cases, he would fly to Washington, DC three to
five days before a hearing just so he could conduct the necessary
legal research at ICSID and local law schools. 3 7 On one trip, he
spent over $1,000 of his own money to buy hard copies of the most
important arbitration treatises to take back to the Solicitor General's
office. 138 Hiring outside counsel was not a viable option due to their
high fees and the overriding importance that Argentina adopt a
consistent, unified position on key issues likely to arise in all the
39
arbitration cases arising out of the emergency economic measures.1
Three years later, with the experience of litigating several ICSID
cases under its belt, Argentina's Solicitor General's office looked
more like an investor-state arbitration practice you might find at one
of the major international law firms. In 2003, the office had at least
ten lawyers working on investment treaty arbitrations, many with
substantial experience in international commercial litigation, degrees
from top law schools, and ready access to all the necessary legal
materials. 40 Yet, even with the added legal firepower, the Solicitor
General's office is overwhelmed by the unprecedented number of
investment treaty claims filed by foreign investors. 141

V. THE SOLUTION: A LEGAL ASSISTANCE
CENTER FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
No system of dispute resolution is perfect. Quite frequently, there
are significant differences in the level of resources and legal talent
available to parties in any form of litigation. In the world of
international commercial arbitration, the quality of each party's
representation is not a major concern, since the consequences are

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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generally limited to the private parties involved. 42 However, the
situation is quite different in investment treaty arbitration, where a
state is the defendant and an adverse award has the potential to affect
the lives of millions of citizens. This is why it is essential that the
international community establish some mechanism to ensure that
developing nations have, at a minimum, affordable access to the
legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a competent defense
to investor claims. Drawing from the success of a similar effort at the
WTO, 143 this Part argues for the creation of a Legal Assistance
Center for developing nations in investment treaty arbitration and
reviews the spectrum of services it might provide.
A. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER

How would a legal assistance center for developing nations benefit
the practice of investment treaty arbitration? First and foremost, it
would bolster the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration
process by ensuring that developing nations have affordable access
to basic legal authority and expertise. As an adversarial process, the
legitimacy and effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration requires
that both parties have a minimum access to legal authority and
expertise. If one side does not have access to adequate legal expertise
or authority, it cannot fully present its case and the tribunal is
deprived of all the information it needs to make an informed and just
ruling. A dispute resolution process that is seen to be unfairly tilted
toward investors will undermine the legitimacy of investment treaty
arbitration and perhaps developing nations' willingness to enter into
future investment treaties.
A legal assistance center would not only promote fairness for
developing nations, but also lead to a more efficient and effective
arbitration process. Better informed developing nation counsel will
make more cogent legal arguments, enhancing the quality of the
142. See Catherine A. Rogers, Emerging Dilemmas in InternationalEconomic
Arbitration: The Vocation of the InternationalArbitrator,20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
957, 992 (2005) (recognizing that arbitration decisions "are generally regarded as

affecting only the specific parties involved and not ... the public at large").
143. See Advisory Centre on WTO Law [ACWL], Dispute Settlement,
http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/dispute-e.aspx
(last visited Jan. 14, 2007)
(describing the reasons behind the creation of the ACWL; specifically to provide
legal assistance to developing nations in WTO dispute settlement proceedings).
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arbitration process and the ultimate result. Developing nation counsel
who understand the real legal issues at stake are less likely to make
irrelevant or frivolous arguments, saving the tribunal, opposing
counsel, and investors' time and money. For example, in CDC v.
Seychelles, the tribunal found the Seychelles' initial pleadings were
confusing and failed to comply with its instructions, forcing it to
grant an extension for clarification.' 44Moreover, the tribunal strongly
hinted that the Seychelles' application for annulment bordered on the
frivolous, reflected in its decision that the Seychelles pay all of the
CDC's costs associated with the annulment process.1 45 If the
Seychelles had access to affordable outside legal advice, it is entirely
possible these costly errors could have been avoided.
Even if a Legal Assistance Center would enhance the legitimacy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration, is it a
practical or realistic proposal? How should it be funded? What
services should it offer? For some guidance on these questions, we
can look to international trade law and recent efforts to provide
developing nations with enhanced access to the WTO's dispute
settlement process.
B. THE ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW AS A POTENTIAL
MODEL

The international community recently confronted the question of
how to provide developing nations with effective access to
international dispute mechanisms with regard to the WTO's dispute
settlement process. 4 6 One of the developing nations' chief
complaints that emerged from the failed 1999 Ministerial Talks in
Seattle was unequal access to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.' 47 The substance of the complaints related to two
familiar issues: a lack of WTO trade law expertise within their own
144. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
146. See ACWL, supra note 160 (offering that the ACWL was created to help
developing countries participate in the multilateral trade system).
147. See John H. Jackson, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, Keynote Address at the Inauguration of the Advisory Centre on WTO
Law: Perceptions About the WTO Trade Institutions (Oct. 5, 2001),
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/newsdetailsphoto-e.aspx?id=7192a684-8dac-4d9 1974d-4f4f9ed3a682.
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governments and no mechanism to help offset the prohibitive cost of
obtaining private legal counsel. 4 8 These charges were taken
seriously because they implied the dispute mechanism was tilted
toward wealthier developed nations, undermining a basic sense of
fairness that is at the heart of the legitimacy of any dispute resolution
49
mechanism. 1
In 1999, at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, a coalition of
developed and developing nations 5 ° signed the Agreement
Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law ("ACWL"), 5 ' which
entered into force in July of 2001. The ACWL was established in
Geneva in July 2001 "as a unique inter-governmental organization,
independent of the WTO."' 5 2 It is funded and controlled by the
developed and developing countries that both co-own and coadminister it.'53
The purpose of the ACWL is to "provide legal training, support
and advice on WTO law and dispute settlement procedures to
developing countries.' 54 The Centre offers members three principal
services for free or at subsidized rates:
(1) legal advice on WTO law, including the compatibility
of proposed legislation and government measures;
(2) support
proceedings;

to parties

in WTO

dispute settlement

148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Founding members of the ACWL include: Bolivia, Canada, Colombia,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, the
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.
151. ACWL,
Agreement
Establishing
the
ACWL,
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/doc-e.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).

152. ACWL, About Us, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about-e.aspx (last visited
Jan. 14, 2007).
153. See id.
154. ACWL, supra note 151, art. 2(1).
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(3) and training of government officials in WTO law
through seminars and internships.' 55
Membership in the ACWL is open to both developing and
developed nations. 5 6 However, the services of the Centre are only
available to developing nations, economies in transition, and leastdeveloped countries.' 57 The Centre's fee structure seeks to promote
membership in the ACWL, while maintaining access for the poorest
nations regardless of membership. Membership incentives include
discounts on services and a higher priority access when the Centre is
asked to assist multiple parties in a dispute. 5 8 Fees for services
rendered in dispute settlement proceedings are billed at hourly rates
on a sliding scale based on the country's share of world trade and
59
GDP, with least developed nations billed at only $25 per hour.
ACWL members and all least developed countries receive free legal
advice regarding WTO law, not to exceed a certain maximum level
of hours determined by the Management Board. 6 ° The Centre
maintains a roster of external counsel16' for referrals at points when
demand for its services is too high, a conflict of interest exists, or it
lacks the necessary expertise in a highly technical case. 162 The
155. See ACWL, Training, http://www.acwl.ch/e/training/training-e.aspx (last
visited Jan. 14, 2007) (describing paid internship opportunities at the ACWL for
trade lawyers from least developed nations).
156. As of May 2005, the Centre has thirty-seven members: ten developed
country members, and twenty-seven members entitled to the services of the
ACWL.
157. See ACWL, supra note 152 (specifying that ACWL does not provide legal
assistance to developed nations).
158. See ACWL, Legal Advice, http://www.acwl.ch/e/legal!legal-e.aspx (last
visited Jan. 14, 2007).
Aspects,
Financial
ACWL,
159. See
(last visited Jan. 14, 2007)
http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/financial-e.aspx
(describing a four-tiered rate schedule for legal services to ACWL members and
least developed countries engaged in the WTO dispute settlement process).
160. See ACWL, Annex IV of the Agreement Establishing the Centre, Schedule
Centre,
the
by
Rendered
for
Services
Fees
of
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/doc-e.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
Counsel,
Legal
of
External
Roster
ACWL,
161. See
(last visited Jan. 14, 2007)
http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/counsel-e.aspx
(identifying thirteen law firms and six individual lawyers registered with the
ACWL); see also ACWL, Rules for the Subcontracting of External Legal Counsel,
9, ACWL Doc. ACWL/MB/D/2004/4 (adopted on Mar. 26, 2004).
162. See Friedrich Roessler, Executive Director of the ACWL, Speech
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current staff of the Centre consists of an Executive Director, Deputy
63
Director, six lawyers, and two support staff.
C. A PROPOSED LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER
To be effective, a Legal Assistance Center does not need to rival
the resources, expertise, or services of the major international law
firms. Instead, it should aim to provide developing nations with highquality information, legal advice, and training on an affordable basis.
In this manner, the Center will fill a niche by providing developing
nations with an option between the risk of relying solely on an inhouse defense and the expense of hiring outside counsel.
1.

Services

The shape and size of a Legal Assistance Center would of course
depend, in part, on the type of services it offers to developing
nations. A Legal Assistance Center could offer developing nations a
spectrum of services, including: 1) a repository for access to all
relevant legal authority; 2) training to enhance the capacity of
developing nations to negotiate future BITs and defend themselves
against investor claims; 3) legal advice or representation on a range
of matters, including the compatibility of proposed legislation with
BIT obligations and assistance in defending actual investor claims. A
closer look at each of these potential services will help clarify their
relative costs and purpose.
i.

Repositoryfor Legal Authority

At a minimum, a Legal Assistance Center should serve as a
repository for relevant legal authority, including published and
unpublished tribunal awards, arbitration treatises and journals, and
other academic commentary. A facility like this could serve as a
"one-stop" library for developing nations, greatly simplifying the
task of finding relevant legal authority and ensuring, at a minimum,

Delivered at the Inauguration of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (Oct. 5, 2001),
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/newsdetailsphoto-e.aspx?id=7e0 114b4-1819-45ab9cce-494179ace633.
163. See ACWL, About Staff, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/staff e.aspx (last
visited Jan. 14, 2007).
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that all parties have access to basic legal authority. Library staff
might also maintain a list of qualified counsel who have expressed an
interest in assisting developing nations on a pro-bono basis or at a
reduced rate.
ii. Training to Enhance Capacity

A long term goal of a Legal Assistance Center should be to build
developing nations' in-house capacity to negotiate BITs and defend
investment treaty claims. The potential benefits of training programs
are twofold. First, they will allow developing nation counsel to
develop at least some expertise with emerging developments in
public international investment law and the relevant arbitration rules.
Secondly, they will provide a forum where developing nation
counsel can share experiences and strengthen professional
relationships with Center staff. In this manner, training will serve a
preventative function, ensuring that developing nations are not
totally unfamiliar with treaty arbitration and can make informed
decisions on whether they should settle or litigate an investor claim.
There appears to be great demand for training programs from
developing nations who have faced investment treaty claims.
UNCTAD, together with Organization of American States and the
Canadian Agency for International Development, recently held a
seminar on managing investment disputes in Washington, DC, for
several countries from Latin America who are facing investment
treaty claims. 1" The course examined the substantive treaty-based
standards that give rise to most investment treaty disputes, as well as
key jurisdictional concepts, through case studies and insights from
experienced arbitration practitioners. The course was well-received,
with participants from Central America calling upon the UNCTAD
Secretariat to set up a facility to assist in the actual management of
investor-state disputes for the region, through capacity-building,
supply of information and research, and institutional support. 165 The
Legal Assistance Center could build on this success, partnering with

164. See UNCTAD, Advanced Seminar of ManagingInvestment Disputes, (Nov.
at
available
2005),
3-11,

http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite pcbb/docs/dite-pcbb-ias42-en.pdf
165. See id. at 3.
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UNCTAD and other organizations to organize future training
sessions.
The Center also might consider paid internships as an innovative
way to provide developing nation personnel with invaluable practical
experience with the investment treaty arbitration process. The
ACWL recently launched a Secondment Programme for Trade
Lawyers, a program where government trade lawyers from leastdeveloped countries and eligible ACWL Members join the staff of
the ACWL as paid trainees for a period of nine months. 166 The
Programme aims to "provide the participants with both theoretical
training and practical experience in WTO law and an opportunity to
participate actively in WTO dispute settlement proceedings." 167
There has been an overwhelming response to the program, with fiftytwo applications received from ACWL members and LDC non168
members.
iii.Legal Representation

Access to legal authority is an important first step, but legal
expertise is required to interpret that authority and marshal the
relevant facts into an effective defense. Likewise, training programs
can be an effective way to build long term capacity, but they are no
substitute for actual legal assistance in defending a concrete, pending
investor claim. Developing nations with no prior experience in
investment treaty arbitration nor the means to afford outside counsel
may need some form of subsidized legal representation to effectively
defend an actual investor claim. A Legal Assistance Center has
several options to provide developing nations with access to
affordable legal expertise.
As a first step, the Center could provide developing nations with
forms of legal advice short of full representation. For example, the
Secondment
Programme
for
Trade
Lawyers,
166. See
ACWL,
http://www.acwl.ch/e/pdf/secondment-programme-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2007).
167. Id.
168. See ACWL, LDCs and ACWL Members Respond Positively to Launch of
Lawyers,
Secondment
Programme
for
Trade
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news detailsphoto-e.aspx?id=cd657f31-5594-47f4a9a7-937a354cba49 (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) (noting that lawyers from LDCs
submitted a majority of the applications to the program).
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Center could offer legal opinions on the text of a proposed BIT, the
compatibility of a proposed law with a current investment treaty, or a
preliminary analysis of the merits of a potential investor claim. With
the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of key investment treaty
provisions, developing nations may need assistance in clarifying
whether proposed or current government measures may expose them
to liability. Likewise, the Center might offer expert legal opinions on
proposed treaty language to ensure that developing nations are aware
of the full implications of specific treaty provisions. In this manner,
the Center will serve an important preventative function, allowing
developing nations to steer clear of disputes in the first place rather
than litigating after the fact. A similar service offered by the ACWL
has been used extensively by member nations. 16 9 In the same vein,
the Center could offer a preliminary analysis of the legal merits of an
investor's claim at the outset of a dispute, allowing developing
nations to make an informed decision whether to settle or hire
outside counsel.
At the most ambitious end of the spectrum, the Legal Assistance
Center could provide developing nations with direct legal
representation during the arbitration proceedings. Borrowing from
the successful ACWL dispute settlement assistance program, 17 0
lawyers from the Center could work alongside developing nation
counsel on everything from drafting effective pleadings to presenting
oral arguments before the tribunal. The involvement of Center staff
would vary with the needs of each client, but would always seek to
merely assist developing nation counsel as opposed to replacing
them during the proceedings. Offering this kind of full, direct legal
representation would provide developing nations with a true low-cost
alternative to hiring one of the major international firms. However, it
would also be very resource intensive, limiting the number of clients
the Center could realistically serve at any given time.

169. See ACWL, supra note 158.
170. See
ACWL,
Dispute
Settlement,
http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/dispute-e.aspx
(last visited Jan. 14, 2007)
(documenting the fact that the ACWL has provided direct legal representation to
developing nations in at least fourteen different WTO disputes, at both the Panel
and Appellate level).
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2. Location
At first glance, the most obvious location for a Legal Assistance
Center might appear to be ICSID, the institution that facilitates the
majority of investment treaty arbitrations. 7 ' As a World Bank
institution, ICSID already has a development orientation and a
talented, multilingual staff of lawyers and support personnel familiar
with investment treaty arbitration. However, ICSID is not well-suited
to play host to a Legal Assistance Center due to limitations related to
its core mission as a neutral dispute settlement facility: investors
would question its objectivity and developing nations would be
unlikely to seek advice from an institution whose core mission
prevents it from being an advocate for their interests. Due to these
limitations, it is difficult to see ICSID hosting anything more
ambitious than a repository for legal authority or perhaps a legal
referral center.
A different, more plausible home for a Legal Assistance Center is
with the UNCTAD. "Established in 1964, UNCTAD promotes the
development-friendly integration of developing countries into the
world economy." '72 UNCTAD already sponsors seminars for
developing nations on effective BIT negotiation tactics, the
management of investment treaty arbitration disputes, and an on-line
guide to ICSID arbitration.'73 However, UNCTAD has some
limitations of its own. As a U.N. organization, it may be susceptible
to political pressure from the wealthier nations who fund most of its
programs. Hosting a Legal Assistance Center that provides direct
legal representation to developing nations may attract opposition
from developed nations if they perceive it as a threat to their
investors.

171. See Gary Born et al., Email Alert, Investment Treaty Arbitration: ICSID
Amends
Investor-State
Arbitration
Rules
(Apr.
14,
2006),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetai.aspx?publication=96f4126
0-dbce-4da3-b080-afflfd588be9&RSS=true (acknowledging that "the bulk of'
bilateral investment treaties include provisions for ICSID arbitration).
172. UNCTAD,

About

UNCTAD,

http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=1530&lang=l

(last visited

Jan. 14, 2007).
173. See,
e.g.,
UNCTAD,
Course
on
Dispute
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=2102&lang=l

Settlement,
(last visited

Jan. 14, 2007).
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Rather than seeking to fit within another organization's mandate, a
Legal Assistance Center could be created as a wholly new,
independent inter-governmental institution. Of course, this would
require leadership in getting the organization off the ground and
locating funding sources. Financial support from sympathetic
industrial nations and private foundations may be necessary to raise
the initial pool of capital needed to launch the Center and sustain it
during its first years.'74 Sustaining the Center over the long term will
likely require some combination of grants, fees for legal services,
and possibly membership contributions. The Centre might consider
soliciting donations for an endowment to ensure its long-term
financial stability and independence. 75

CONCLUSION
Even as the popularity of investment treaty arbitration has grown,
its legitimacy is threatened by reports from developing nations of a
lack of affordable access to the legal authority and expertise needed
to defend investor claims. 17 6 Due to a lack of relevant legal expertise
within their own government ministries, many developing nations
are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms at a cost
of millions per year."' Meanwhile, those who cannot afford outside
counsel face scattered, incomplete sources of precedent and have
nowhere to turn for affordable legal assistance."7 ' Given that even a
single lost claim could wreak havoc on a developing nation's
economy, something must be done to fill this void in legal services.
A Legal Assistance Center would bolster the legitimacy of
investment treaty arbitration by providing developing nations with an
alternative, low-cost option for obtaining legal assistance. Better
174. See Andrea Greisberger, Enhancing the Legitimacy of the World Trade
Organization: Why the United States and European Union Should Support the
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 827, 840 (2004)

(indicating that the financial support of the nine developed nations who signed the
"Agreement establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law" was critical to
creating the $8 million dollar fund used to launch the ACWL).
175. See id. at 842 (noting that part of the ACWL annual operating budget

comes from its endowment fund of approximately $20 million).
176. See discussion supra Part V.A (arguing that the legitimacy of investment
treaty arbitration depends on each party having adequate representation).
177. See supra text accompanying note 94.
178. See supra text and accompanying note 100.
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prepared developing nation counsel will make more cogent legal
arguments, allowing the tribunal to clearly identify the issues in the
case and produce a well-informed award. By ensuring that
developing nations have affordable access to legal authority and
expertise, investment treaty arbitration will more perfectly fulfill its
mission of providing a truly neutral and just form of dispute
settlement.

